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Newsome: Securities Litigation, Bankruptcy and Business: The Supreme Court

SECURITIES LITIGATION, BANKRUPTCY AND
BUSINESS: THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS IN A
DECISIVE TONE*
P. David Newsome, Jr.t

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. My task has been made
easier by the overview of business-related decisions by Professor Bucholtz. The
thoroughness of her comments frees me to be a bit of gadfly and address several decisions that deal with current issues, have practical importance, or are
interesting and well written.
I. LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF SECURITIES LITIGATION
Let me begin with a decision that falls in my category of current issues.
During the Supreme Court's term, Congress enacted a sweeping revision of the
federal securities laws. The revision, enacted over President Clinton's veto, was
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995' ("Reform Act"). The
Reform Act amended the federal securities laws in a number of respects; perhaps most notable were the provisions designed to curb abusive class action
lawsuits.
Within this context, Congress addressed the plight of the so-called
"world's unluckiest investor." This hypothetical investor is one who seems to
repeatedly appear as a lead plaintiff in securities class action lawsuits.2
The legislative history of the Reform Act described a typical encounter
with this investor. In 1993, Philip-Morris issued a news release announcing a
reduction in the average price of its cigarettes.3 The company announced that
the price reduction would signal a reduction in earnings.4 Within five hours of

*

Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner'sGuide to the October 1995 Supreme

Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, December 6, 1996.
t Shareholder, Conner & Winters, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma. B.A., 1970, Central State College; J.D.,
1976, University of Oklahoma.
I. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996)).
2. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32-33 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 731-32.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 33 (1995).
4. See id.
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the announcement, the first lawsuit was filed by a plaintiff who owned sixty
shares of Philip-Morris' common stock.' Four more class action lawsuits were
filed the same day, and five additional actions were filed the next day. Two of
the complaints accused Philip-Morris of engaging in conduct to create and
prolong the illusion of the company's success in the toy industry!
As Professor Bucholtz suggested in her opening remarks, there have been a
number of efforts to tinker with the class action device since the adoption of the
Reform Act. As one manifestation of this effort, state substantive and procedural laws are being revisited to see if there are viable alternatives for class actions
outside the federal courts. Legislative initiatives, such as Proposition 211 in
California (which would have made California state courts much more receptive
to securities fraud actions) have been proposed, although the Proposition was
rejected by California voters in November.'
A. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein
A decision by the Supreme Court in February may prove to be a useful
tool for plaintiffs as the viability of state court actions, class actions included,
are explored in response to the Reform Act. The decision, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Epstein,9 dealt with the question of whether exclusively federal claims can be released in the settlement of a state court class action."0 Stated
more elegantly in the words of Justice Thomas, the author of the opinion, the
court examined the question of "whether a federal court may withhold full faith
and credit from a state-court judgment ...simply because the settlement releases claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."" The Court
concluded that such a release was entitled to full faith and credit. 2
The decision arose from a 1990 tender offer by Matsushita for the common
stock of MCA, Inc.' The tender offer spawned a class action in the Delaware
Court of Chancery for breach of fiduciary duty against MCA and its directors. 4 Other state law claims were later added to the action.'
After the state court action was filed in Delaware, a class action was filed
in federal court in California. 16 The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securi-

5. See Id.
6. See id.
7. See id.(citing Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Out of Control Securities Suite, WASH.TIMES, Feb. 9,
1995, at 1;Junda Woo, Judges Show Growing Skepticism in Class-Action Securities Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan.
11, 1995, at Cl). See also In re Philip Morris Sec. Lit., 872 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd in part and
rev'd in-part, 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996).
8. See Rodney Ho, Mr. Entrepreneur Goes to Washington: Elections Give Smaller Firms New Power,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1996, at B2.
9. 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996).
10. See id. at 875-76.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 876.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/7

2

1997]

Newsome:
Securities Litigation,
Bankruptcy
Business: The Supreme Court
SECURITIES,
BANKRUPTCY
AND and
BUSINESS

ties Exchange Act of 193417 ("Exchange Act") and the rules thereunder."
Section 27 of the Exchange Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal
courts for suits to enforce the Exchange Act and rules thereunder. 9
Skipping the procedural aspects of the case, the Delaware court action was
settled while the federal class action was pending. The settlement purported to
encompass all claims arising under the federal securities laws including, specifically, the claims asserted in the federal court action in California.' The respondents in the case were members of the Delaware and California classes
who did not opt out of the settlement class or appear to contest the settlement." When Matsushita invoked the settlement as a bar to prosecution of the
California federal class action, the issue was framed.
The majority opinion focused on the Full Faith and Credit Act,' which
mandates that "judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit
in every court within the United States ...as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State... from which they are taken."24 The opinion explained
that section 1738 may be applicable to state court judgments incorporating class
action settlement of claims subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts " In making this determination, a court should be guided by the framework established in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons2
B. The Test in Marrese
Marreseestablished a two-part test. First, the law of the state rendering the
judgment must be analyzed to determine the effect of the judgment. If state law
would bar the claim from litigation in a state court, the first element of a twopart test is satisfied." This was the result under Delaware law in this case. The
second part of the test requires the court to determine if the claim is an exception to the rule in section 17 3 8 .' In this case, the Court reviewed the purpose
of the exclusivity provision in section 27 of the Exchange Act (e.g., the expertise of the federal courts in the resolution of such claims and the benefits from
the uniform application of the Exchange Act29), and concluded that there were
no irreconcilable conflicts between section 1738 and section 27 that would

17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
18. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 116 S.Ct. at 876.

19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1994).
20. See MatsushitaElec. Indus. Co., 116 S. Ct. at 876-77.
21. See id. at 877.
22. The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Breyer joined Justice Thomas.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined in part. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice
Ginsburg also dissented in part.
23. 28 U.S.C § 1738 (1994).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
27. See id. at 381.
28. See id.
29. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 116 S. Ct. at 882 (citing Murphy v. Gallagher, 761 F.2d 878, 885
(2d Cir. 1985)).
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prevent state courts from exercising jurisdiction over the settlement of such
claims.'
Before leaving the case, I want to note Justice Ginsburg's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Time has not permitted me to delve into all
of the details of the two class actions, but Justice Ginsburg wrote a very persuasive discussion of the adequacy of representation question, an element in any
class action, its constitutional implications, and its bearing on the outcome of
the case." She also mentioned a settlement proposed in the Delaware class
action but rejected by the Chancery Court.32 The rejected settlement will guide
us back to our point of origin - abusive class actions and the Reform Act. The
settlement provided for no monetary benefit for the class members and a $1
million fee for the class action plaintiffs' lawyers. 3
The ramifications of the Matsushita decision remain to be developed by
class action lawyers and the courts, but it appears to encourage litigants to
explore the state courts for the next chapter of the class action struggle. Business lawyers who represent public clients or those seeking financing in the
capital markets inevitably will witness many more developments in this area.

II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf
Let me shift the focus of my comments to the Bankruptcy Code ("Code")
and a decision of practical importance to many of you. In Citizens Bank of
Maryland v. Strumpf,34 the Court examined the conflict between a bank's
setoff rights and the automatic stay in section 326(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.35
The respondent filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code 6
at a time when he had an account with the bank. At the time of filing the respondent was in default on a loan to the bank in the amount of approximately
$5,000 and he had over $5,000 deposited in his account.37
The bankruptcy filing triggered the automatic stay" thereby preventing
various types of activities by creditors to collect on their debts, including the
setoff of debts. 9 You can easily imagine the frustration of a bank holding a
bankrupt customer's deposits in excess of the outstanding balance of a loan in
default.

30. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 116 S. Ct. at 883.
31. See id. at 884-89.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id. at 886.
See id.
116 S. Ct. 286 (1995).
11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (1994).
11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1994).

37. See Citizens Bank of Maryland, 116 S. CL at 288.

38. See 11 U.S.C § 362 (1994). Section 362(a)(7) expressly prohibits the setoff of prepetition debts.
39. See Citizens Bank of Maryland, 116 S. Ct. at 288.
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In this case, however, the bank placed what it termed an "administrative
hold" on so much of the debtor's account as the bank claimed was subject to
setoff." Shortly thereafter, the bank filed a motion with the bankruptcy court
for relief from the stay, and to setoff the defaulted loan balance against the
deposits subject to the administrative hold."
The bankruptcy court found the administrative hold constituted a setoff in
violation of the stay and sanctioned the bank for its actions.42 Several weeks
later, the bankruptcy court lifted the stay and authorized the setoff.43 The authorization, however, was to no avail because the account balance by that time
was zero."
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether the administrative hold imposed by the bank
was the equivalent of a setoff thereby violating the automatic stay. The Court
concluded that it was not.45
The Court explained that section 362(a)(7) of the Code4 expressly prohibits "the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy case] against any claim against the debtor."'47
While creditors' pre-bankruptcy setoff rights are recognized by section 553(a)
of the Code," the exercise of such rights is subject to the automatic stay.
The Supreme Court held that the creditor's refusal to pay its debt while it
sought relief from the stay was not a setoff as contemplated by the Code.49
The action by the bank was not a permanent reduction of the respondent's
account balance, an essential element of a setoff. The opinion discussed the
elements of a setoff under state law" but concluded that the determination of
whether the setoff occurred under section 362(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code is a
matter of federal law." Under either federal or state law, however, for there to
be a setoff there must be a permanent adjustment of the indebtedness.52
This decision provides an important tool for financial institutions. Because
of the practical similarity between an administrative hold and a setoff, the
bank's motion for relief from the stay and to authorize the setoff filed in conjunction with the administrative hold was critical in the outcome because it
evidenced an intent not to setoff in violation of the automatic stay.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id.
See Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1994).
Citizens Bank of Maryland, 116 S.Ct. at 288.

48. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1994).
49.
50.
effect a
51.
52.

See Citizens Bank of Maryland, 116 S.Ct. at 289.
The opinion explained that a majority of states find a setoff to occur when there is a decision to
setoff, some action is taken to do so and the setoff is recorded. See id.
See Citizens bank of Maryland, 116 S.Ct. at 289.
See id.
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B. United States v. Noland
Let me mention a second decision arising from the bankruptcy courts.
United States v. Noland53 dealt with the doctrine of equitable subordination
and the administrative priorities established by the Bankruptcy Code. The question was whether a post-petition, noncompensatory tax penalty, normally an
administrative expense entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Code, could be
subordinated under section 510(c) of the Code."
To understand the issue, consider the impact on creditors. In a Chapter 755
proceeding, such as the one here, the assets available for distribution to creditors upon the liquidation of the debtor are reduced by administrative expenses
allowed by the Code 6 The administrative expense involved in this case was a
penalty for unpaid taxes accruing after the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding.Y Because the tax itself and the interest thereon were not disputed
as administrative expenses, the I.R.S. would sustain no pecuniary loss. Creditors, on the other hand, would have their distributions reduced by the amount of
the penalties paid by the debtor.
Thus, the application of the doctrine of equitable subordination entered the
picture. The doctrine, a judicial creation recognized by section 510(c) of the
Code,"8 allows a bankruptcy judge to subordinate certain claims, notwithstanding Congress' legislative scheme in the Bankruptcy Code, when the conduct of
a creditor is inequitable. 9 For conduct to be inequitable, it must have conferred some unfair advantage on the creditor or disadvantage to other creditors.
In addition, the subordination must not be inconsistent with other provisions of
the Code."
In writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter recognized limits on the
power of courts to equitably subordinate claims.6' The Court determined that
the power to subordinate is limited by the statutory framework established by
Congress in the Bankruptcy Code.62 That framework is the source of priority
for administrative expenses such as nonpecuniary tax penalties. Equitable subordination, to fit within this framework, should be justified by the particular facts
of the case.63 A bankruptcy judge, in exercising equitable powers, cannot make
categorical distinctions which have the effect of rewriting the Code.'

53. 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994).

55. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994).
56. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 503(b)(1), 726(a)(1).
57. The case was originally filed as a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 1101-1174 (1994), but was converted to a liquidation under Chapter 7. The penalties were related to
taxes due after the Chapter 11 filing but before the case was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. See Noland,
116 S. Ct. at 1525.
58. See Noland, 116 S. Ct. at 1526 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1994)).
59. See id.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 1527.
62. See id.
63. See id.

64. See id. The opinion in particular rejected the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals conclusion that such
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The Court concluded that a categorical distinction is exactly what had
happened in the bankruptcy court and that there were no "particular" facts to
justify equitable subordination." While the unsecured creditors lost this one to
the I.R.S., the opinion's deference to Congress' legislative scheme was justified.
III. SAVINGS AND LOANS

If I could persuade you to read one decision from last term to give you an
idea of the Court's expertise in analyzing complex business issues, I would
refer you to United States v. Winstar Corporation.' This is an extraordinary
opinion involving arcane accounting issues in the savings and loan industry.
The case involved the rather mundane subject area of government contracting,
but I found it to be strong evidence of the ability of the Court to navigate its
way through extremely complex business issues. Today, my point is to bring
the case to your attention, especially the facts, without an exhaustive discussion
of the government contracting issues resolved by the Court.
For many, the savings and loan crisis of the last decade is nothing more
than a historical footnote. With the perspective we gain from the passage of
time, however, this crisis may occupy a significant role in the study of law and
public policy. Let me start my discussion of the case with some background
about the savings and loan crisis as explained by Justice Souter 7 in the opinion.
Savings and loan associations were creatures of the New Deal created to
provide home mortgages.' Savings and loan associations, also known as S&Ls
insured by the Federal Savings and
and thrifts, accepted deposits that were
69
Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC").
Because of soaring interest rates in the late 1970s. and the early 1980s,
many S&Ls suffered financial problems brought about by high interest rates
required to secure deposits and portfolios of fixed rate mortgages at low interest
rates.:' The response of the federal government to alleviate the possibility of
widespread insolvencies was to deregulate the thrift industry!' Through legislation passed in the early days of the Reagan Administration, thrifts were
allowed to invest in new ways and to compete more aggressively for deposits. 2 Along with deregulation came the reduction in the capital reserve require-

penalties are susceptible by their very nature to subordination. See id.
65. See id.at 1528.
66. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
67. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. He was joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer.
Justice O'Connor joined in part. Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented and was joined in part by Justice Ginsburg.
68. See Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 2440.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 2441.
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ments. 3 The reduction in the capital reserve requirements allowed the institutions to grow explosively without increasing capital; deregulation allowed thrifts
to expand into new (and often riskier) investments.'
As I mentioned, insurance on deposits was provided by the FSLIC. The
reserves of FSLIC declined by approximately $2 billion between 1980 and
1985.' 5 Reserves in 1985 were $4.55 billion.76 In 1985, the FSLIC estimated
that it would take approximately $15.8 billion to close all of the institutions
deemed insolvent under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). By
1988, however, FSLIC was insolvent by $50 billion. The cost of the crisis
through the end of 1995 amounted to $140 billion.'
Realizing that the FSLIC lacked the funds to bail out all of the insolvent
S&Ls, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("F.HLBB"), the industry's regulatory authority, encouraged a number of so-called "supervisory mergers" between
healthy thrifts and insolvent ones. 8 Such transactions were not intrinsically
advantageous to healthy institutions so, as an inducement, the FHLBB promised
that the acquisitions would be subject to special accounting treatment to help
the healthy institutions meet their capital requirements.79
The Winstar decision involved three supervisory mergers in which three
healthy institutions negotiated for, and were granted, special accounting treatment as part of the transactions. Each of the supervisory mergers occurred
before 1989,8° the year Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,8 also known as FIRREA.
FIRREA completely rewrote the regulatory scheme in the savings and loan
industry and as part of the process eliminated all of the special accounting
gimmicks in supervisory mergers consummated before FIRREA 2 With the
elimination of the accounting gimmicks, two of the three S&Ls involved in this
case were declared insolvent and seized by the government. The third was able
to survive after a massive private recapitalization.83
The three institutions involved in this case filed actions in the Court of
Federal Claims for breach of contract. 4 They won.
The starting point in the court's decision was the special accounting treatment given to the supervisory mergers. Absent FIRREA, there was no question
that the institutions were entitled to employ the accounting treatment authorized
and approved by the FSLIC and FHLBB in the supervisory mergers. Under
FIRREA they could not. Thus, could the federal government, through the adop-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Id. at 2442.
See id.
See id. at 2447.
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (1994)).
See Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 2446.
See id. at 2447.
See id.
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tion of FIRREA, deny the accounting treatment it had previously authorized?
Did the contracts limit the authority of the government to regulate the thrift
industry?
The opinion written by Justice Souter reviewed a number of special rules
applicable to contracts with the government. The first, and perhaps the most
interesting, is the canon of construction that the surrender of sovereign authority
must appear in "unmistakable" terms.' As applied here, the Court had to resolve the question of whether the government's sovereign prerogative was limited by the contracts in question. The government argued that it was. 6 The institutions, however, argued that the government's authority to regulate was
unimpeded by the contracts. The contracts merely allocated the risk of loss to
the government if the government changed the regulatory scheme' (i.e., if the
government ended the accounting gimmicks).
The Court carefully traced the development of the unmistakability doctrine,
and explained that modem impetus for its development was the application of
the Contracts Clause 8 to public contracts. 9 The doctrine evolved from certain
public contracts by state legislatures which had the effect of binding successor
legislatures. The decisions generally involved an effort to abrogate subsequent
government action on the basis of a contract granting a concession to a party.'
Justice Souter's opinion distinguished these cases. Here, the institutions did
not seek to abrogate FIRREA.9' The government and the institutions, as the
institutions had argued, had agreed to allocate the risk of losses caused by future sovereign acts.' This, the Court found, would not implicate the
government's sovereign powers at all and, accordingly, would not be subject to
the unmistakability doctrine. 3
Time has limited my treatment of this case. I recommend that you read it
for the analysis of legal issues unique to government contracts, especially in
anticipation of regulatory and political change. But more importantly in the
context of today's topic, the level of analysis of the business issues throughout
the opinion, including the concurring and dissenting opinion, is excellent.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 2453.
See id.
See id.
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
See Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 2454.
See id.
See id. at 2458.
See id.
See id. at 2459.
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